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Abstract: Diversification is touted as a desirable policy objective for oil rich nations because 
it reduces exposure to volatility. However, the empirical relationship between petroleum and 
diversification is not well understood. Here, we test the effect of giant oil discoveries on 
diversification using a panel dataset of 136 countries observed over the period 1962 to 2012. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Export diversification and structural change is often touted as a desirable policy objective for 
petroleum rich nations. This is based on two related theoretical predictions. First, petroleum 
produces a highly concentrated structure of export revenue which is then exposed to volatility 
in petroleum prices. Such volatility in the long term is harmful for sustainable development 
and economic growth. Second, petroleum riches engender an economic structure that is 
highly concentrated and reliant on imported consumer goods and non-tradable services. Such 
structurally skewed economies are unable to deliver long term prosperity as the latter depends 
on rapid structural change away from non-tradables in the direction of tradables such as 
manufacturing and modern services. 
In contrast, the classical trade theories of David Ricardo, Eli Heckscher and Bertil 
Ohlin predict that countries specialise and not diversify their exports and such pattern is 
largely dependent on the factor endowments rather than anything else. If a country is 
abundant in petroleum then it is perfectly predictable that it will have a petroleum dominated 
structure of exports.  
Given such ambiguity between theoretical predictions and policy preferences, it is of 
enormous importance that policy advice be grounded in hard empirical facts. Yet, the 
empirical relationship between petroleum wealth, structural change, and export 
diversification is imperfectly understood. Is the relationship fundamentally driven by factor 
endowments? Do other factors such as politics and policy play a role? Given the common co-
movement problem in observational data, to what extent we can attribute a causal relationship 
between petroleum wealth, structural change, and export diversification? What role political 
institutions and hence policy play in influencing the relationship between petroleum wealth 
and structural change?  
A quick glance at the data in figures 1 and 2 suggest that petroleum wealth could 
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indeed be an important variable in understanding diversification patterns across countries and 
over time. Figure 1 presents scatter plots of the ratio of employment in the tradable and non-
tradable sectors of an economy against oil dependence measured as a share of oil rent to GDP 
over the sample period 1962 to 2012. We can observe a clear positive pattern in panel A 
indicating non-tradable sector employment dominate over tradable sector employment in 
petroleum rich states. This pattern is somewhat weaker for countries with relatively strong 
political institutions (panel B) but stronger for countries with relatively weak political 
institutions (panel C). This pattern is repeated in figure 2 when we plot the ratio of non-
resource exports to resource exports against petroleum wealth. 
In this paper, we aim to systematically assess the role of petroleum in promoting or 
hindering structural change and export diversification. Using a panel dataset covering the 
period 1962 to 2012 and 136 countries we estimate the causal effect of giant oil discoveries 
on structural change and export diversification. All the estimates control for unobserved 
country-specific heterogeneity and time varying common shocks. We find evidence of non-
oil export concentration 8 years after a giant oil discovery. The effect on the labour market 
structure however is absent. We find no effect of discovery on the structure of employment in 
the non-resource and manufacturing sectors. 
The relationship between petroleum wealth and structural change could be influenced 
by the quality of political institutions and policy. Therefore we also test for potential 
heterogeneity in the relationship conditioned on institutional quality. We find that more 
democratic and inclusive political institutions moderate the concentration effects of 
petroleum discovery on exports but not the labour market. Similar trends are also observed 
with executive constraint as an alternative measure of institutions. 
The paper makes the following original contributions. First, the paper presents an 
estimate of the causal effect of petroleum discovery on structural change and export 
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diversification. To the best of our knowledge, this result is entirely new. There are several 
recent studies that focuses on export diversification (see Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003; Cadot et 
al., 2011; and others) but none of them analyse the impact of petroleum discovery on 
diversification. Second, our dataset allows us to examine the effect of discovery news shock 
on tradable and non-tradable employment. This is a new result. Third, the paper also analyses 
the effect of institutional quality on diversification and presents new results.  
Our identification strategy relies on the exogenous variation in the discovery dates of 
giant oil deposits. Our dataset codes a petroleum deposit (oil or/and gas including 
condensate) as giant if it has the capacity to generate 500 million barrels of ultimate 
recoverable oil or gas equivalent. Even though it is possible to identify the area where 
petroleum resources are likely to be found using geological data, it is not possible to 
accurately predict the timing of giant discoveries. Giant discoveries are rare and therefore the 
discovery dates of giant reserves are exogenous. One might argue that politicians and 
government could manipulate the announcement of the precise timing of discovery. Our data 
could potentially be immune to such possibility as the discovery dates are independently 
verified and recorded by multiple sources.  
How exogenous is petroleum discovery? One could argue that petroleum discovery 
depends on exploration effort and effort depends on pre-existing political and economic 
conditions. It is also imperative that pre-existing economic and political conditions influence 
the structure of exports and the economy. Therefore, causal influence could run in the other 
direction from economic diversification to petroleum discovery. We test this argument 
empirically in section 2 and find that pre-existing economic and political variables do not 
predict discovery dates of giant petroleum reserves. Moreover, we also control for past 
petroleum discoveries as a proxy measure of discovery effort in all our estimated models. 
Finally, for the skeptics of the exogeneity of giant petroleum discoveries we estimate the 
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model using ‘out of region natural disasters’ and ‘oil reserves per capita’ as instruments for 
oil discovery.3 These issues are discussed further in the remainder of the paper. 
Our empirical strategy to estimate the heterogeneous effect of institutions rely on the 
Jones and Olken (2004) methodology. They observe institutional score prior to a random 
even and here we do the same by observing Polity2 score in the year prior to the discovery 
year. This mechanism allows the assessment of institutional quality one year prior to giant 
petroleum discovery so that the empirical estimate is not contaminated by any institutional 
change occurring simultaneously or thereafter.   
Another related question is why we choose petroleum over other commodities. The 
reasons are as follows. First, the spatial distribution of petroleum discoveries are not skewed 
and therefore it offers the desired variation in the dataset to conduct a cross-national analysis 
(Wick and Bulte, 2009). If the discoveries were concentrated in one or two locations then any 
correlation between petroleum discoveries and diversification could be due to location 
specific unobservable confounding factors. Second, nearly most of recent resource 
discoveries have been in petroleum which makes the empirical analysis of its effect a 
worthwhile endeavor (Smith, 2015). Third, the resource curse literature attributes special 
properties to petroleum as a commodity which makes it important in the context of 
diversification and structural change. For instance, refining crude does not lead to a 
significant reduction in its weight. Therefore crude producing countries do not enjoy 
significant transport cost reducing advantages by setting up refineries locally. Furthermore, 
petroleum is capital intensive and has very little backward and forward linkages. In crude 
exporting poor countries they often remain as an enclave not contributing to the development 
of the rest of the economy (Alsharif et al., 2017).  
Our paper is related to a literature on diversification. This literature mainly documents 
                                                 
3 We follow Cotet and Tsui (2013) in using the abovementioned variables as instruments. 
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the pattern of diversification across countries and over time without exploring the role of 
petroleum wealth as a potential driver of such patterns. For example, Imbs and Wacziarg 
(2003) using sector level data on employment and production value added document a non-
monotonic U-shaped pattern in diversification. In particular, Countries diversify at low levels 
of per capita income and up to a certain threshold. Beyond that threshold level of 
development countries experience sectoral concentration. This pattern is also confirmed by 
Cadot et al. (2011) when it comes to exports. Using a large database of 156 countries and 
tracking then over 19 years and 4991 product lines they find support for the U-shaped pattern 
in export diversification. 
There is also a literature that examines the relationship between diversification 
patterns and growth. For example, Lederman and Maloney (2003), Hausmann et al. (2007) 
and Easterly at al. (2009) document that export patterns are path dependent and matter 
immensely for a nation state’s long term growth prospect. Similar observations are made by a 
literature on structural change which documents large differences in labour productivity 
across traditional and modern sectors of an economy (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011; 2014; 
Rodrik, 2013). This literature argues that such differences in productivity is a major drag on 
the development potential of these economies. Again, none of these studies explore the role 
of petroleum discovery in hindering structural change.      
The nearest to our paper is a literature on resource curse and Dutch disease. One of 
the key early theoretical contribution is from Corden and Neary (1982). Corden and Neary 
(1982) note that a resource windfall benefits the tradable primary export and non-tradable 
service sectors but at the expense of tradable non-resource (or manufacturing) sector. 
Subsequently, empirical research by Auty (2001), Gylfason (2001) and Sachs and Warner 
(2001, 2005) note that resource rich countries on average grow much slower than resource 
poor countries. This is further confirmed by studies that argue that natural resources may 
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lower the economic performance because they strengthen powerful groups, weaken legal 
frameworks, induce volatility, and foster rent-seeking activities (e.g., Ross, 2001; Ramey and 
Ramey, 1995; Koren and Tonreyro, 2007; and Besley, 2006). Others have argued whether 
natural resources are a curse or a blessing depends on country-specific circumstances 
especially institutional quality (eg., Mehlum et al., 2006; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010, 
2014; Bhattacharyya and Collier, 2014) and natural resource type (Isham et al., 2005).  
In spite of the emerging consensus, the resource curse thesis is increasingly 
challenged by recent studies which uses more disaggregated spatial datasets and alternative 
identification strategies. For example, Smith (2015) finds no evidence of an oil curse using a 
cross-national dataset. Mamo et al. (2016) find very little evidence of a curse using spatial 
data on mineral discovery and nighttime lights in Africa. Similar observations are made for 
the US by Allcott and Keniston (2014) who examine the spatial effects of the Shale oil and 
gas boom at the county level.  
The export diversification part of our paper closely relates to Bahar and Santos 
(2018). They argue that resource exports increase wages which makes several of the non-
resource sectors expensive to operate. As a result non-resource exports become highly 
concentrated. They also show that a larger share of natural resources in exports lead to export 
concentration. They use commodity price shocks and oil discovery as instruments for the 
share of natural resource exports in their instrumental variable estimates. They also find that 
the non-resource export basket of resource rich countries are dominated by capital intensive 
products. Our results on non-resource export diversification in petroleum rich countries 
broadly concur with their results. However, unlike Bahar and Santos’ (2018) instrumental 
variable approach we focus on the direct effects of oil discovery. Our empirical model allows 
us to examine the intertemporal effects of discoveries with lags and leads which yields new 
results. This is crucial as not all discoveries enter production and not all of them enter 
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production at the same time. On average it takes 8 to 10 years for a deposit to be developed 
and enter production. This allows us to distinguish between the expectation induced (after 
discovery but before the start of production) and revenue induced (after start of production) 
effects. These results are entirely new. In addition to examining export diversification, we are 
able to analyse diversification in employment, manufacturing employment, and 
manufacturing value added. In contrast, Bahar and Santos (2018) solely focus on export 
diversification.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 analyses the effect of 
giant petroleum discovery on structural change and export diversification. In doing so, it 
carefully analyses the history of oil discovery, data, estimation strategy and results. Section 3 
analyses the role of institutions and the heterogeneous effects of petroleum on tradable and 
non-tradable sectors. Section 4 presents additional robustness results and section 5 concludes. 
2 Oil Discovery and Economic Diversification 
 
2.1 What Drives Oil Discovery? Lessons from the History of Oil 
Our identification strategy relies on the exogeneity of giant oil discovery. In other words, we 
argue that new giant oil discoveries are exogenous because they are independent of country 
specific factors. In this section, we explore the history of the oil industry and exploration 
across the globe. This exercise provides further credence to our thesis that oil discovery is 
orthogonal to country or market specific factors.  
Yergin (1991) and Ross (2012) notes that Edwin Drake found oil in 1859 in 
Pennsylvania using the drilling method. Prior to Drake’s drilling, oil was usually collected 
from water surface and used mainly for therapeutic purposes. Such use of oil dates back to 
3000 B.C. Babylon and various other parts of the Middle East. Drake’s invention of the 
drilling technology however significantly altered the oil landscape with the establishment of 
oil industry first in the United States, and later in the Russian Empire and some parts of East 
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Asia. With the outbreak of World War 1, the global demand for oil surged stimulating 
exploration effort. Increased exploration effort led to new discoveries and expansion of 
production all across the globe. Furthermore, new technologies such as the seismograph, 
aerial surface plotting, and micropaleontology significantly improved production in the 1920s 
and the 1930s. Following World War 2, production expanded to new locations in the French 
colonies of North and Sub-Saharan Africa (Algeria, Congo, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria). This 
expansion in production was driven by ever increasing military demand from imperial armed 
forces rather than anything specific to these countries. The post war period also witnessed 
expanded use of automobiles which further strengthened petroleum demand.  
Introduction of more new technologies from the scientific disciplines of 
geochemistry, sedimentology, satellite imaging, and computing improved the prospects of 
new discovery even further. Offshore deep water drilling technologies also made discoveries 
feasible in locations which were inaccessible in the past. 
The structure of the supply side however witnessed very few changes during this 
entire period even though petroleum production increased. The supply side of the oil market 
was dominated by seven major oil companies – the so called “seven sisters”.  These 
companies were Standard Oil of New Jersey (later Exxon), Standard Oil of California (later 
Chevron), Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later BP), Mobil, Texaco, Gulf and Royal Dutch 
Shell. These companies controlled nearly the entirety of the oil market.  
Therefore, what we learn from this historical detour is that giant petroleum 
discoveries are mainly driven by global factors, such as advancement in technology and 
increased demand. They appear to be unaffected by oil price changes in the 1970s (Smith, 
2015).  Smith (2015) notes that most of discoveries occurred before the 1970s price hike and 
prior to the oil shock prices were fairly low. They also appear to be exogenous to country 
specific factors. Nevertheless, we include country fixed effects in our model to account for 
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country specific factors. We also include time dummies to control for global factors such as 
technology and demand shocks.   
2.2 Empirical Strategy and Data 
We use a panel dataset covering up to 136 countries observed over the period 1962 to 2012.4 
To examine the effect of giant oil discovery on diversification we estimate the following 
model. The model is similar in spirit to Lei and Michaels (2014). 
                                      21=it j i t it it itDiv Disc X                                            (1) 
 where it jDiv   is the outcome variable (export diversification or structural change) in country 
i  and year t j , i  is a country dummy variable accounting for country fixed effects, t  is a 
year dummy variable controlling for time varying common shocks, itDisc  is an indicator of a 
giant oilfield discovery in country i  and year t , and itX is the number of years with resource 
discoveries in the last ten years (from 10t   to 1t  ). We estimate this model for different 
leads j , where in most cases {2, 4, 6,8,10}j . This is important for the purpose of tracking 
long terms effects of the oil discovery shock. In order to check robustness of the coefficient 
estimate of interest, we include additional covariates in the extended version of this 
specification. The additional covariates include GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared.   
Our main coefficient of interest here is 1 , which is the effect of an oil discovery 
shock on diversification. If a giant oil discovery shock leads to export and structural 
concentration then we would expect 1  to be positive and statistically significant. Any 
indication otherwise would indicate that this is not the case. 
Our main dependent variables are the export diversification and structure change 
measures. We use sectoral data on non-resource employment and exports to compute 
concentration indices. Employment data is sourced from the ILO and UNIDO whereas the 
                                                 
4 Due to data limitations, most but not all specifications cover 136 countries. In most specifications, the 
panel is unbalanced. Appendix A1 presents a list of countries included in the sample. 
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export data is sourced from WITS. We also use sectoral value added data for manufacturing 
from UNIDO to check the robustness of our results. The number of countries in the dataset is 
up to 136 with varying degree of development. The observations are annual, covering the 
period from 1962 to 2012. We compute several measures of diversification and most of them 
are inspired by the income equality literature. Our preferred measure of diversification is the 
Gini coefficient. Nevertheless, we also estimate our model using other indices such as Theil 
and Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) and the regression results are similar.5 This is not surprising 
given that all the indices are highly correlated. Tables 1 and 2 presents descriptive statistics 
and correlation coefficients of these indices respectively. Appendix A3 also provides further 
details on how the indices are computed, the underlying data structure and source. The Gini 
coefficient varies between 0 and 1 and a higher Gini would imply that exports or the labour 
market is highly concentrated whereas a lower Gini would signal diversification.  
There is no consensus in the literature with regards to the most appropriate measure of 
diversification. Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) for example report Gini, HH index and the 
Coefficient of Variation. In contrast, Cadot et al. (2011) drop the coefficient of variation and 
only use Gini and the HH index. McMillan and Rodrik (2011) only focus on the Coefficient 
of Variation while ignoring Gini and the HH index. We run our regressions using all three 
indices (Gini, Theil and HH) but we only report the Gini index in the main paper. All other 
results involving HH index and Theil index are reported in the Online Appendix. 
According to our data from the ILO, Algeria in 1984 appears to be the most 
diversified in terms of employment in the non-resource sector. Greece in 2006 appears to 
have highly diversified exports whereas exports in Libya over the period 1976 to 1981 
appears to be highly concentrated. 
Oil discovery data is sourced from Lei and Michaels (2014), which is based on a 
                                                 
5 These results are reported in the Online Appendix. 
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dataset by Horn (2004). Horn reports the date of discovery, the name of the discovering 
country, and a number of other variables, for 910 giant oilfields discovered both onshore and 
offshore over the period 1868 to 2003. As we have mentioned earlier, to qualify as a giant 
discovery, an oilfield must contain ultimate recoverable reserves of at least 500 million 
barrels of oil equivalent.  
We plot the number of giant oil discoveries over time in figure 3. The plot shows that 
discoveries peaked in the 1960s and 1970s, while declining significantly in the 1980s. 
Double-digit discoveries returned in the late 1990s but the declining trend continued in the 
noughties. Of the total 910 giant oilfield discoveries covered by Horn (2004), only 364 are 
used in this paper which took place within our sample period 1962 to 2003.6 The 
diversification data that we have from UNIDO, ILO and WITS runs till 2012 and therefore 
giving us the opportunity to analyse the effect of a discovery shock up to a decade later. 
The discovery episodes (364 country-year observations) are 5.2 percent of the total 
sample size and therefore are rare events. This is further confirmed in table 3. We observe 
that 40 percent of the giant discoveries during our sample period came from Asia followed by 
Europe (19 percent), Africa (17 percent), South America (10 percent), North America (9 
percent) and Oceania (5 percent). The treatment group consists of 64 countries who 
experienced at least one giant oil discovery during the sample period. The control group 
consists of 72 countries who have never experienced any giant oil discoveries. This provides 
an opportunity for a balanced comparison.  
Finally, we also use GDP per capita as a control variable and these figures are sourced 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Before we engage in estimating the average effect it is probably worthwhile analysing 
                                                 
6 The aim here is to estimate the intertemporal effect of the same discovery shocks. Using different 
discovery shocks for different lag length does not make the time lapse effect of these shocks comparable. 
Nevertheless, we also estimate our main regression using different discovery shocks for different time lags and 
the result is robust. 
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some country specific trends. In figure 4 we examine the effect of giant oil discoveries on the 
structure of exports. We deliberately choose countries with very different political 
institutions. We observe export concentration post giant oil discovery news shock but the 
effect appears to be somewhat mild for democracies (Denmark and Spain) as opposed to non-
democracies (Egypt and the Republic of Congo). The discoveries displayed in these figures 
are not necessarily exclusive; there might be more giant discoveries in other years.  
Figure 5 focuses on the industrial (manufacturing) employment in Egypt, Indonesia, 
Norway, and Australia. Irrespective of the institutional background, it appears that countries 
experience concentration in industrial employment post petroleum discovery.  
2.3 Evidence 
2.3.1 Identification 
Our underlying identification assumption is that giant petroleum discoveries in a country are 
exogenously timed and are orthogonal to the underlying economic conditions of that country. 
Therefore, before we start testing the impact of giant petroleum discoveries on 
diversification, it is worthwhile testing the underlying identification assumption.7 To do that, 
we estimate a fixed-effects logit model in table 4, where the independent variables are lags of 
diversification in non-resource and manufacturing sectors and other political economic 
variables (lagged polity2 score, lagged GDP growth, lagged GDP per capita growth, lagged 
government expenditure growth, and lagged investment growth) and the dependent variable 
is a dummy variable equal to one in the year of a giant petroleum discovery. If the 
identification assumption is invalid then we would observe past changes in political and 
economic variables would predict the petroleum discovery dates. As expected, we find that 
the key variable of interest – diversification – as well as changes in other economic and 
political variables do not predict giant oil discoveries. We also estimate the model with a lag 
                                                 
7 Note that Smith (2015) also uses a similar test and finds similar results. 
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length of 2 and the result remains unaffected.  
2.3.2 Oil Discovery and Diversification: Baseline Results 
In table 5 we estimate the effect of petroleum discovery on non-resource export 
diversification and structural change. In panel A we notice export concentration 8 years post 
giant oil discovery and the effect is statistically significant. The magnitude of the non-
resource export concentration effect somewhat declines after a decade post discovery but still 
remains significant. This is in line with the expectation that it takes 5-6 years post discovery 
for reserves to come into production and hence we notice a delayed concentration effect. The 
magnitude of the coefficient is one tenth of the sample standard deviation, a relatively small 
effect. To put the magnitude of the coefficients in perspective, let us consider Angola in 
1990. It has a non-resource export diversification Gini of 0.8765 very close to the sample 
maximum of 0.8888. A giant oil discovery in 1990 will increase non-resource export 
concentration Gini in Angola to 0.8895 in 1998 and to 0.9005 in 2000. Note that Nigeria 
registers very high concentration of non-resource exports with Gini of 0.8259 in 2003. Our 
estimates predict that a giant oil discovery in Angola will push it significantly higher than 
Nigeria in terms of export concentration. Panels B and C deals with non-resource 
employment and manufacturing employment. The distribution of employment in both non-
resource and manufacturing sectors appear to be unaffected by the discovery news shock. 
This is not entirely surprising. Modern petroleum industry is extremely capital intensive and 
therefore petroleum discovery shocks are not expected to affect the labour market in a major 
way.  
Lei and Michaels (2014) point out that petroleum discoveries in a country’s recent 
past could raise the likelihood of additional discoveries in the immediate future. It could also 
significantly reduce the likelihood of a giant discovery if the country has low potential in 
terms of reserves. Therefore, all specifications reported in table 5 controls for giant petroleum 
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discoveries in the last ten years. They also control for country fixed effects and time varying 
common shocks (year dummies). Figure 6 plots the effect 4 years before (t-4) and 10 years 
after (t+10) the discovery shock.  
2.3.3 Do the Size of Petroleum Discovery Matter? 
So far we have concentrated on giant oil discoveries. What if smaller petroleum discoveries 
affect diversification disproportionately more than giant discoveries? Smaller discovery 
shocks however are unlikely to be exogenous. Nevertheless, in table 6 we examine the effect 
of non-giant discovery shocks on non-resource export diversification and structural change. 
The data for non-giant oil discoveries is sourced from Horn (2004) which classifies oil 
discoveries into giant and major. Major deposits contain ultimate recoverable reserves of less 
than 500 million barrels of oil equivalent. We find evidence of export concentration but no 
effect on the structure of employment in the non-resource and manufacturing sectors.  
Giant oilfield discoveries themselves vary in terms of sizes and could be a potential 
source of heterogeneity. Therefore, one could question the justification of lumping all these 
discoveries of varying degree and size under one group namely giant. In other words, what if 
the size distribution among the giant discoveries matter for diversification? To investigate, 
we test the relationship between the different sizes of giant discoveries and diversification. In 
table 7, we divide the giant oilfield discoveries normalized by population by their respective 
size. In particular, we divide them into four quartiles based on the size of the estimated 
ultimate recoverable reserves divided by population. We notice that the effect is small for 
quartiles 1 to 3 and mostly insignificant. Some coefficients are significant but only at the 10% 
level. The strongest effect is registered by the largest discoveries in quartile 4. The non-
resource export concentration effect is strong and statistically significant after 8 years. This 
result supports the view that the super-giant discoveries wield the most influence on 
diversification and structural change. Note that quartiles calculated using raw discovery size 
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also has the same effect.   
3 Oil Discovery, Political Institutions and Diversification 
3.1 Empirical Strategy and Data  
To examine the effect of political institutions we estimate the following modification of 
equation (1). 
                       31 2 1=it j i t it it it ititDiv Disc Disc INS X                                  (2) 
 where 1itINS   is a measure of the quality of political institutions in country i  and year 1t  . 
The resource curse literature emphasize the role of political institutions in influencing the 
relationship between natural resources and economic development. Therefore it is worthwhile 
testing whether political institutions also affect the relationship between petroleum discovery 
and diversification. 
We use polity 2 score from the Polity IV database as a proxy measure of political 
institutions or democracy. Ross (2001) documents that measures of political institutions or 
democracy could be endogenous to petroleum wealth. Hence we use lagged polity 2 score to 
account for the quality of political institutions before petroleum discovery. The variable 
varies between -10 and +10 with a higher score indicating better quality political institutions. 
The advantages of using the polity 2 variable is that it covers a broad cross-section of 
countries throughout our sample period. It is also conceptually attractive given that it codes 
formal constraints that are placed on the executive. Nevertheless, we also use executive 
constraint as an alternative measure of political institutions in the robustness section and the 
results are robust. 
We are interest in the partial effects of a petroleum discovery shock and hence the 
coefficients 1 and 2 . If a giant petroleum discovery shock leads to export and structural 
concentration in the non-resource sector then we would expect 1  to be positive and 
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statistically significant. If better quality political institutions moderate that effect then we 
would expect 2  to be positive and significant. 
3.2 Evidence 
In table 8 we report coefficient estimates of 1 and 2 . In panel A we find strong evidence of 
export concentration 8 years after a giant petroleum discovery. This concentration effect stays 
statistically significant 10 years after a discovery. The concentration effect is moderated by 
better quality political institutions as the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and 
significant 8 years after discovery.  
In panels B and C we check the effect of discovery on the internal structure of the 
economy and especially the labour market in the non-resource and manufacturing sectors. We 
do not find any statistically significant effect of discovery on employment.  
4 Robustness 
 
The quality of political institutions are dependent on the constraints that are imposed on the 
chief executive. Therefore, it is important to analyse the direct effect of such constraints. In 
table 9 we replace the polity 2 variable with executive constraints. In panel A we find that the 
export concentration effect of discovery remains unaffected. This effect is moderated by 
executive constraints only 8 years after the giant discovery. In panel B we notice strong 
concentration effect on employment in the non-resource sector 6 years post discovery and 
beyond. This effect is also moderated by higher levels of executive constraint. Panel C deals 
with manufacturing employment only with data from the UNIDO. We do not observe any 
statistically significant effect of giant petroleum discovery.  
An alternative identification strategy is to use oil reserves and natural disasters as 
instruments for giant petroleum discoveries. In table 10 we follow Cotet and Tsui (2013) and 
use oil reserves and natural disasters as instruments for oil discoveries. The oil reserves 
instrument is log of oil reserves calculated for each country-year by subtracting cumulative 
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production from cumulative discovery. The data is sourced from the Association for the 
Study of Peak Oil (ASPO). Known oil reserves are likely to positively influence future oil 
discoveries. The other instrument is the log of out-of-region natural disaster where five kind 
of disasters are considered: earthquake, volcano, mass movement, storm and flood. Cotet and 
Tsui (2013) describes out-of-region disasters as the value of all disaster damages minus the 
value of own region damages. Natural disasters could affect oil discoveries through 
unexpected interruptions in exploration work. Therefore, it can serve as an instrument for 
discovery. However, natural disasters could also affect diversification through other channels 
therefore may not be ideally suited to satisfy the exclusion restriction. In panel A we find 
evidence of concentration 10 years after discovery. In panels B and C we also find evidence 
of concentration in employment in the non-resource and manufacturing sectors. This 
concentration effect is moderated by better quality political institutions.  
Arezki et al. (2017) argue that large oil discoveries are not exogenous as countries 
with open economies are more likely to make discoveries. Therefore, we run table 5 panel A 
with the “openness” dummy variable as an additional control variable. The results do not 
change. 
Finally, we also re-estimate tables 5 and 8 using alternative measures of 
diversification. In particular, instead of using Gini coefficient we use Theil index and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) index as measures of diversification and our main result remains 
unchanged. These results are reported in the Online Appendix. Furthermore, we also 
calculate Gini using 2 digit sectors and re-estimate panel A of table 5. Results are robust.  
5 Conclusions 
 
Using petroleum resources to promote a diversified economy has been a challenge especially 
for petroleum rich developing countries. This is in addition to the challenges faced by these 
countries in terms of capital constraints, attracting private investments into the petroleum 
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sector, and maintaining a disciplined fiscal regime to capture revenue and reduce 
macroeconomic volatility (Venables, 2016). Both national and international policy circles 
acknowledge these challenges and promote economic diversification as a desirable objective. 
In spite of such rare policy consensus, our knowledge of the empirical relationship between 
petroleum wealth and diversification is largely incomplete. Causal direction of the 
relationship is also partially understood.  
In this paper, we systematically assess the role of petroleum wealth on diversification. 
In particular, we estimate the causal effect of giant oil discoveries on structural change and 
export diversification. We find evidence of non-oil export concentration. This export 
concentration effect is somewhat moderated by better quality political institutions. We also 
find that countries experience concentration of employment in the non-tradable sector relative 
to the tradable sector two years post petroleum discovery but the effect is short lived.      
We contribute to the literature by estimating the effect of oil discoveries on export 
diversification and structural change. This is a new result. Our dataset allows us to distinguish 
between tradable and non-tradable sector employment which is new. We also introduce 
political institutions into this literature.  
The diversification challenge for petroleum rich economies is not exclusively a 
developing country problem. In fact a quick look at the export composition data reveals that 
even for a developed nation such as Norway with good political institutions resource exports 
have reached almost 50% of total exports in 2013 crowding out other tradables. In fact 
Norway’s share of manufacturing exports dropped from approximately 70 percent in 1972 to 
only 17 percent in 2013. The shares per se should not be a concern, but the association with 
less non-resource output is worthwhile noting. Our regression analysis also confirms this 
trend. This underscores the strength of the specialization argument put forward by the 
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A2. Countries and the Type of Government One Year Prior to Discovery 
Country Discovery year Type of government   
(polity2) 
Country Discovery year Type of government   
(polity2) 
Argentina 1971 Autocratic (-9) Mexico 1951 Autocratic (-6) 
 1977 Autocratic (-9)  1952 Autocratic (-6) 
 1989 Democratic (8)  1958 Autocratic (-6) 
 1996 Democratic (7)  1966 Autocratic (-6) 
Brazil 1965 Autocratic (-3)  1972 Autocratic (-6) 
 1968 Autocratic (-8)  1975 Autocratic (-6) 
 1972 Autocratic (-9)  1976 Autocratic (-6) 
 1984 Autocratic (-3)  1977 Autocratic (-6) 
 1985 Autocratic (-3)  1979 Autocratic (-3) 
 1987 Democratic (7)  1980 Autocratic (-3) 
 1989 Democratic (7)  1982 Autocratic (-3) 
 1993 Democratic (8)  1990 Autocratic (0) 
 1996 Democratic (8)  1998 Democratic (6) 
 1999 Democratic (8) Nigeria  1958 NA 
 2001 Democratic (8)  1959 NA 
 2002 Democratic (8)  1962 Democratic (8) 
 2003 Democratic (8)  1963 Democratic (8) 
Colombia 1956 Autocratic (-5)  1964 Democratic (8) 
 1973 Democratic (7)  1965 Democratic (7) 
 1992 Democratic (9)  1967 Autocratic (-7) 
 1993 Democratic (9)  1968 Autocratic (-7) 
Congo, Rep 1969 Autocratic (-7)  1970 Autocratic (-7) 
 1971 Autocratic (-7)  1973 Autocratic (-7) 
 1983 Autocratic (-8)  1981 Democratic (7) 
 1995 Democratic (5)  1989 Autocratic (-7) 
Indonesia 1969 Autocratic (-7)  1990 Autocratic (-5) 
 1970 Autocratic (-7)  1996 Autocratic (-6) 
 1971 Autocratic (-7)  1998 Autocratic (-7) 
 1972 Autocratic (-7)  1999 Autocratic (-1) 
 1973 Autocratic (-7)  2000 Democratic (4) 
 1974 Autocratic (-7)  2001 Democratic (4) 
 1982 Autocratic (-7)  2002 Democratic (4) 
 1991 Autocratic (-7) Thailand  1973 Autocratic (-7) 
 1994 Autocratic (-7)  1980 Democratic (2) 
 1995 Autocratic (-7)  1995 Democratic (9) 
 1996 Autocratic (-7) Venezuela 1954 Autocratic (-3) 
 1997 Autocratic (-7)  1955 Autocratic (-3) 
 1999 Autocratic (-5)  1957 Autocratic (-3) 
 2000 Democratic (6)  1958 Autocratic (-3) 
Iran  1958 Autocratic (-10)  1979 Democratic (9) 
 1960 Autocratic (-10)  1980 Democratic (9) 
 1961 Autocratic (-10)  1986 Democratic (9) 
 1962 Autocratic (-10)  1988 Democratic (9) 
 1963 Autocratic (-10)  1999 Democratic (8) 
 1964 Autocratic (-10)  2002 Democratic (6) 
 1965 Autocratic (-10) 
 1966 Autocratic (-10) 
 1967 Autocratic (-10) 
 1968 Autocratic (-10) 
 1969 Autocratic (-10) 
 1972 Autocratic (-10) 
 1973 Autocratic (-10) 
 1974 Autocratic (-10) 
 1975 Autocratic (-10) 
 1976 Autocratic (-10) 
 1978 Autocratic (-10) 
 1980 Autocratic (0) 
 1988 Autocratic (-6) 
 1991 Autocratic (-6) 
 1992 Autocratic (-6) 
 1993 Autocratic (-6) 
 1994 Autocratic (-6) 
 1995 Autocratic (-6) 
 1999 Democratic (3) 
 2000 Democratic (3) 
 2001 Democratic (3) 
Note: This table only lists countries that experienced at least one regime switch. 
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A3. Data Appendix: 
Employment data  
Sectoral employment data are from International Labor Office (ILO, 2013) and United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2012). ILO data covers 127 countries, while UNIDO 
covers 125 countries. The ILO data includes all economic activities at the 1-digit level between 1969 
and 2008. Sectoral shares are in percentages. The unbalanced panel has 2369 observations (country-
year). The ILO dataset reports employment in different classifications: some countries use the ISIC-
revision 2, others moved to ISIC-revisions 3 and 4 in recent years, and some are using their own 
national classification. Employment data in the more disaggregated ISICrev3 and ISICrev4 were 
aggregated to ISICrev2, following Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), Timmer and de Vries (2008) and 
McMillan and Rodrik (2011). If a country reports two revisions, the lower one is used. Official 
estimates are preferred over labor surveys. Data not following ISIC conventions are dropped. Table 
B1 shows the concordance between ISICrev3 and ISICrev2. 
Table	B1:	different classifications between ISIC revisions 2 and 3*	
ISIC-Revision 2  ISIC-Revision 3 Equivalent 
1. Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing A. Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 
B. Fishing 
6. Wholesale and Retail Trade and Restaurants 
and Hotels 
 
G. Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor 
Vehicles, Motorcycles and Personal and 
Household Goods 
H. Hotels and Restaurants 
8. Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business 
Services 
J. Financial Intermediation 
K. Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 
9. Community, Social and Personal Services 
 
L. Public Administration and Defense; 
Compulsory Social Security 
M. Education 
N. Health and Social Work 
O. Other Community, Social and Personal Service 
Activities 
P. Households with Employed Persons 
* McMillan and Rodrik (2011) and Timmer and de Vries (2008) 
 
ILO data sometimes have sudden big changes in numbers in certain sectors, as countries sometimes 
change their calculation method even if the same classification/revision is used. This is taken into 
consideration in this study, by dropping the observations that reports these sudden changes making the 
panel more harmonized.  
Our alternative data source is UNIDO, which covers manufacturing activities only at the 3-digit level 
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of disaggregation (the main 23 industrial sectors) between 1963 and 2010 (INDSTAT2). (INDSTAT4 
disaggregates to 4-digit level but only goes back to 1985). The UNIDO dataset is consistent over the 
years and did not need adjustment. The unbalanced panel has 3564 employment observations 
(country-year). 
Exports data  
Exports data are from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), which is collaboration between 
the World Bank and the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The 
export data covers 133 countries. Data is selected in SITC-1-digit aggregation containing the main 10 
trade sectors (0 Food and live animals; 1 Beverages and tobacco; 2 Crude materials, inedible, except 
fuels; 3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials; 4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes; 5 
Chemicals and related products, not elsewhere specified; 6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by 
material; 7 Machinery and transport equipment; 8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles; 9 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in SITC. Values are reported in constant 1000 
USD with base year 2000. The unbalanced panel has 4575 observations (country-year). The WITS 
data values are consistent over the years and did not need any adjustment.  
Diversification Indicators  
Computation of these measures is done in Stata.8 
 
Table B2: The main differences between the chosen concentration measures9. 
Index Distance Concept Decomposable? Independence of input scale & 
population size? 





Depends on rank 
ordering 








Absolute differences Yes No: decreases with population Yes: but min>0 
 
We calculate diversity for all sectors, and for all non-resource sectors. Specifically, in the ILO data we 
exclude “Mining and Quarrying”, and in the WITS exports data we exclude “Crude material, inedible, 
except fuels”, “Mineral Fuels, lubricants and related materials” and “Commodities not classified 





                                                 
8See AINEQUAL: Stata module to compute measures of inequality. 
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Notes: Resource movement effect; as labour move from tradable to non-tradable sectors with higher oil 
abundance. X-axis is oil dependency measures by oil rent share in GDP, data from the World Bank. Y-axis is 
the relative employment share in non-tradable to tradable sectors within the ILO data. Panel (a) includes all 
countries in our dataset. Countries in panel (b) are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Columbia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, 
Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of 
America, Venezuela. Countries in panel (c) are: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Cameroon, 
China, Cuba, Egypt, Gabon, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 















Notes: concentration in resource exports, in all regime types. X-axis is oil dependency measures by oil rent 
share in GDP, data from the World Bank. Y-axis is the relative non-resource to resource exports from the WITS 
dataset. Panel (a) includes all countries in our dataset. Countries in panel (b) are: Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Columbia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Venezuela. Countries in 
panel (c) are: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Cameroon, China, Congo Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, 
Cuba, Egypt, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam. 
 




Figure 4: Oil discoveries and diversification in exports 
 
 
Notes: y-axis shows the Gini coefficient in each country, the x-axis shows the years where data is available. Gini ranges 
between 0 and 1, lower Gini indicates higher diversification. The vertical line shows the year of giant oil discovery in each 
country; the red circle shows the export concentration surge occurring after a giant oil discovery. Data sources: Exports data 
is from WITS. Oil discovery data is from Lei and Michaels (2014). 
 
Figure 5: Oil discoveries and diversification in manufacturing employment 
  
  
Notes: y-axis shows the Gini coefficient in each country, the x-axis shows the years where data is available. Gini ranges 
between 0 and 1, lower Gini indicates higher diversification. The vertical line shows the year of giant oil discovery in each 
country; the red circle shows the employment concentration surge occurring after a giant oil discovery. Data sources:  
manufacturing employment is from UNIDO. Oil discovery data is from Lei and Michaels (2014). 
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Figure 6: Giant Petroleum Discoveries and Economic Diversification 
 
 
Notes: The x-axes report the number of years before or after t, ranging from t-4 to t+10. The black lines show the estimated 
coefficients and the gray lines show the 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, which are clustered by 
country. All regressions control for previous discoveries (t-1 to t-10) and include country and year fixed effects. Details on 

























































countries) Min. Max. 
 ILO Employment (all sectors) 
Gini 2369 0.5028 0.0787 0.0919 0.0374 0.2540 0.8329 
Theil Index 2369 0.4971 0.2230 0.2464 0.1360 0.1044 2.5860 
HHI 2369 0.2273 0.0753 0.1004 0.0348 0.1562 0.9999 
 ILO Employment (non-resource sectors) 
Gini 2369 0.4524 0.0877 0.1023 0.0413 0.2540 0.8132 
Theil Index 2369 0.4002 0.2094 0.2409 0.1175 0.1044 2.0630 
HHI 2368 0.2307 0.0751 0.1011 0.0337 0.1590 0.8136 
 WITS Exports Diversification (all sectors) 
Gini 4577 0.6531 0.1286 0.1168 0.0652 0.3132 0.9 
Theil Index 4576 0.9828 0.8018 0.6537 0.4968 0.1731 23.025 
HHI 4554 0.3683 0.2059 0.1904 0.0950 0.1327 1 
 WITS Exports Diversification (non-resource sectors) 
Gini 4575 0.6243 0.1139 0.0997 0.0658 0.3077 0.8888 
Theil Index 4574 0.8708 0.9329 0.6555 0.6931 0.1631 19.775 
HHI 4558 0.3440 0.1590 0.1388 0.0901 0.1435 1 
 UNIDO Manufacturing Employment (employment) 
Gini 3564 0.5087 0.1086 .1109 .0435 0.2886 0.8823 
Theil Index 3564 0.5313 0.3302 .4064 .1397 0.1482 3.0334 
HHI 3558 0.1345 0.0850 .1016 .0280 0.0612 0.8742 
 Other Variables  
Oil discoveries 8933 0.0499 0.2178 0.1159 0.1843 0 1 
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Table 3: Number of years (from 1962 to 2003) with one or more giant oilfield discoveries, by 
country (treatment countries) 
Country Years Country Years Country Years 
Former USSR 29 India 5 Albania 1 
Iran 24 Algeria 4 Azerbaijan 1 
Saudi Arabia 24 Argentina 4 Bangladesh 1 
Australia 18 Colombia 4 Cote d'Ivoire 1 
Nigeria 17 Congo, Rep. 4 Denmark 1 
China 16 Kuwait 4 Ecuador 1 
United States 16 Qatar 4 Equatorial Guinea 1 
Norway 15 Peru 3 France 1 
Indonesia 14 Thailand 3 Gabon 1 
Brazil 13 Tunisia 3 Germany 1 
United Arab Emirates 12 Bolivia 2 Hungary 1 
United Kingdom 12 Brunei Darussalam 2 Morocco 1 
Iraq 11 Italy 2 Namibia 1 
Libya 11 Kazakhstan 2 New Zealand 1 
Mexico 10 Myanmar 2 Papua New Guinea 1 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 8 Netherlands 2 Philippines 1 
Oman 8 Pakistan 2 Romania 1 
Angola 7 Sudan 2 Russia 1 
Canada 7 Trinidad & Tobago 2 Spain 1 
Malaysia 6 Vietnam 2 Turkmenistan 1 




Gini Theil Index HHI 
ILO Employment (all sectors) 
Gini 1.000   
Theil Index 0.897 1.000  
HHI 0.906 0.853 1.000 
ILO Employment (non-resource sectors) 
Gini 1.000   
Theil Index 0.932 1.000  
HHI 0.926 0.917 1.000 
WITS Exports Diversification (all sectors) 
Gini 1.000   
Theil Index 0.741 1.000  
HHI 0.897 0.802 1.000 
WITS Exports Diversification (non-Resource sectors) 
Gini 1.000   
Theil Index 0.677 1.000  
HHI 0.894 0.745 1.000 
UNIDO Manufacturing Employment  
Gini 1.000   
Theil Index 0.906 1.000  
HHI 0.727 0.803 1.000 
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Table 4: Do political and economic variables predict giant oil discoveries? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Previous year’s polity2 score 0.005 
(0.020) 
       




      
Previous year’s manufacturing 
employment diversification (Gini) 
  -0.267 
(2.278) 
     
Previous year’s growth    -3.58e-14 
(9.60e-14) 
    
Change in income pc     -0.000064 
(0.00012) 
   









Observations 2672 772 1437 2092 2256 481 1057 481 
Number of countries 111 67 91 78 104 48 76 47 




1963-2003 1953-2003 1983-2003 1963-2002 1983-2003 
Notes: reported coefficients are from a fixed-effects logit model of the probability of a giant oil discovery occurring in a 







































Table 5: Giant Oil Discovery and Diversification 
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10 
Panel A. Diversification in Non-Resource Exports 
Discovery -0.006 -0.007 0.003 0.013** 0.011* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies 
Observations 3677 3889 3971 3936 3900 
R2 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
No. of countries 126 126 126 126 124 
Years covered 1963-2005 1963-2007 1963-2009 1963-2011 1963-2012 
Panel B. Diversification in ILO sectoral employment 
Discovery -0.0007 -0.0003 0.003 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies 
Observations 2049 2191 2232 2205 2178 
R2 0.84 0.826 0.817 0.814 0.813 
No. of countries 111 112 112 111 111 
Years covered 1970-2005 1970-2007 1970-2008 1970-2008 1970-2008 
Panel C. Diversification in UNIDO manufacturing employment 
Discovery -0.0005 0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.0036 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies 
Observations 3120 3244 3289 3263 3235 
R2 0.871 0.868 0.867 0.866 0.866 
No. of countries 120 119 119 119 119 
Years covered 1964-2005 1964-2007 1964-2008 1964-2008 1964-2008 
Notes: Gini index is the dependent variable. Past Discoveries: the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. Data 
sources: (A) exports data is from WITS. (B) Sectoral employment is from ILO, (C) manufacturing employment is from 
UNIDO. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 6: Non-giant Oil Discovery and Diversification 
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10 
Panel A. Non-Resource Exports 
Discovery -0.006 -0.007 0.003 0.013** 0.011* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies 
Observations 3677 3889 3971 3936 3900 
No. of countries 57 57 57 57 57 
Years  1963-2005 1963-2007 1963-2009 1963-2011 1963-2012 
Panel B. Non-Resource Sectoral employment 
Discovery -0.0001 -0.0001 0.004 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies 
Observations 2049 2191 2232 2205 2178 
No. of countries 55 55 55 54 54 
Years  1970-2005 1970-2007 1970-2008 1970-2008 1970-2008 
Panel C. Manufacturing employment 
Discovery -0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies 
Observations 3120 3244 3289 3263 3235 
No. of countries 55 55 55 55 55 
Years  1964-2005 1964-2007 1964-2009 1964-2010 1964-2010 
Notes: Gini index is the dependent variable. Past Discoveries: the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. Data 
sources: (A) exports data is from WITS. (B) Sectoral employment is from ILO, (C) manufacturing employment is from 
UNIDO. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7: Giant Oil Discovery Size and Diversification 
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10 
Panel A. Discovery size in quartile 1 
Non-Resource Exports -0.007 -0.013 -0.003 0.002 0.017** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
No. of countries 126 126 126 126 125 
Years  1963-2005 1963-2007 1963-2009 1963-2011 1963-2012 
Sectoral Employment 0.004 0.007 0.009 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.058) (0.008) (0.007) 
No. of countries 111 112 112 111 111 
Years  1970-2005 1970-2007 1970-2008 1970-2008 1970-2008 
Manufacturing Emp.  0.002 0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
No. of countries 120 119 119 119 119 
Years  1964-2005 1964-2007 1964-2009 1964-2010 1964-2010 
Panel B. Discovery size in quartile 2 
Non-Resource Exports -0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.010 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
No. of countries 126 126 126 126 125 
Years  1963-2005 1963-2007 1963-2009 1963-2011 1963-2012 
Sectoral Employment -0.004 -0.005 0.004 0.013** -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
No. of countries 111 112 112 111 111 
Years  1970-2005 1970-2007 1970-2008 1970-2008 1970-2008 
Manufacturing Emp.  -0.009 -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
No. of countries 120 119 119 119 119 
Years  1964-2005 1964-2007 1964-2009 1964-2010 1964-2010 
Panel C. Discovery size in quartile 3 
Non-Resource Exports 0.001 -0.000 0.004 0.006 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
No. of countries 126 126 126 126 125 
Years  1963-2005 1963-2007 1963-2009 1963-2011 1963-2012 
Sectoral Employment -0.005 -0.005 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
No. of countries 111 112 112 111 111 
Years  1970-2005 1970-2007 1970-2008 1970-2008 1970-2008 
Manufacturing Emp.  0.003 0.008 0.004 -0.006 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
No. of countries 120 119 119 119 119 
Years  1964-2005 1964-2007 1964-2009 1964-2010 1964-2010 
Panel D. Discovery size in quartile 4 
Non-Resource Exports -0.003 0.005 0.012 0.021*** 0.011 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
No. of countries 126 126 126 126 125 
Years  1963-2005 1963-2007 1963-2009 1963-2011 1963-2012 
Sectoral Employment 0.004 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
No. of countries 111 112 112 111 111 
Years  1970-2005 1970-2007 1970-2008 1970-2008 1970-2008 
Manufacturing Emp.  0.008 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.005 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
No. of countries 120 119 119 119 119 
Years  1964-2005 1964-2007 1964-2009 1964-2010 1964-2010 
Notes: Gini index is the dependent variable. Discovery size normalized by population. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level 
in parentheses. All regressions include previous discoveries over the past ten years, country and year fixed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 




Table 8: Oil Discovery, Political Institutions and Diversification 
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10 
Panel A. Non-Resource Exports 
Discovery -0.005 -0.007 0.005 0.013** 0.011* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Discovery*Polity2(t-1) -0.001 0.002 -0.007 -0.001* -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.0006) (0.006) 
Polity2(t-1) 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies 
Observations 3500 3703 3781 3746 3710 
R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
No. of countries 122 122 122 122 122 
Years  1963-2005 1963-2007 1963-2008 1963-2008 1963-2008 
Panel B. Non-Resource Sectoral Employment 
Discovery 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Discovery*Polity2(t-1) -0.003 -0.004 -0.008 -0.005 -0.01** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Polity2(t-1) -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies 
Observations 1981 2119 2158 2131 2104 
R2 0.858 0.843 0.835 0.833 0.832 
No. of countries 107 108 108 108 107 
Years  1970-2005 1970-2007 1970-2008 1970-2008 1970-2008 
Panel C. Manufacturing Employment 
Discovery 0.01 0.06 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Discovery*Polity2(t-1) -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Polity2(t-1) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies 
Observations 2955 3077 3121 3095 3067 
R2 0.878 0.875 0.873 0.873 0.873 
No. of countries 115 115 115 115 115 
Years  1964-2005 1964-2007 1964-2008 1964-2008 1964-2008 
Notes: Gini index is the dependent variable. Past Discoveries: the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. Data 
sources: (A) exports data is from WITS. (B) Sectoral employment is from ILO, (C) manufacturing employment is from 

















Table 9: Oil discovery, Executive Constraints and Diversification 
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10 
Panel A. Non-Resource Exports 
Discovery -0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.020*** 0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Discovery*xconst (t-1) -0.004 -0.004 0.005 -0.008** -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Executive constraints 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 
(t-1) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies 
Observations 3516 3723 3803 3768 3732 
R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
No. of countries 123 123 123 123 121 
Years  1963-2005 1963-2007 1963-2008 1963-2008 1963-2008 
Panel B. Non-Resource Sectoral Employment 
Discovery -0.003 -0.0002 0.002** 0.002 0.002** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) 
Discovery*xconst(t-1) 0.005** -0.0001 -0.004** -0.003* -0.005*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
Executive constraints -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(t-1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies 
Observations 1981 2119 2158 2131 2104 
R2 0.85 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.82 
No. of countries 107 108 108 107 107 
Years  1970-2005 1970-2007 1970-2008 1970-2008 1970-2008 
Panel C. Manufacturing Employment 
Discovery -0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Discovery*xconst(t-1) 0.002 -0.0001 0.004* -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Executive constraints 0.001* 0.001* 0.0008 0.001* 0.001* 
(t-1) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies 
Observations 2959 3081 3125 3099 3071 
R2 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87 
No. of countries 116 115 115 115 115 
Years  1964-2005 1964-2007 1964-2008 1964-2008 1964-2008 
Notes: Gini index is the dependent variable. Past Discoveries: the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. Data 
sources: (A) exports data is from WITS. (B) Sectoral employment is from ILO, (C) manufacturing employment is from 















Table 10: Oil Discovery, Political Institutions and Diversification: IV Approach 
Outcome in year: t+2 t+4 t+6 t+8 t+10 
Panel A. Non-Resource Exports 
Discovery -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.003** 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.0008) 
Discovery*Polity2(t-1) 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies, Polity2(t-1) 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 7.71 4.40 0.16 10.11 5.19 
Stock-yogo critical value 19.93/7.25 19.93/7.25 19.93/7.25 19.93/7.25 19.93/7.25 
Observations 3500 3703 3781 3746 3710 
R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
      
Panel B. Non-Resource Sectoral Employment 
Discovery 0.012 0.002 -0.035 0.015** -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.047) (0.007) (0.002) 
Discovery*Polity2(t-1) -0.002 -0.003 0.008 -0.003** 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.004) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies, Polity2(t-1) 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 1.72 6.013 0.25 2.39 3.66 
Stock-yogo critical value 19.93/7.25 19.93/7.25 19.93/7.25 19.93/7.25 19.93/7.25 
Observations 1981 2119 2158 2131 2104 
R2 0.858 0.843 0.835 0.833 0.832 
      
Panel C. Manufacturing Employment 
Discovery 0.007* 0.002 0.006* 0.005*** 0.009 
 (0.0035) (0.002) (0.0037) (0.0018) (0.007) 
Discovery*Polity2(t-1) -0.004** -0.011 -0.0032* -0.003*** -0.006 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Controls Past Discoveries, Country Dummies, Year Dummies, Polity2(t-1) 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 2.99 1.0 2.04 9.25 1.46 
Stock-yogo critical value 19.93/7.25 19.93/7.25 19.93/7.25 19.93/7.25 19.93/7.25 
Observations 2955 3077 3121 3095 3067 
R2 0.878 0.875 0.873 0.873 0.873 
Notes: Gini index is the dependent variable. Past Discoveries: the number of years with discoveries from t-10 to t-1. 
Instrumental variables are the log (out-of region natural disaster), and the log (oil reserves per capita) and their interaction 
with Polity2 for instrumenting the interaction term (Discovery*Polity2). Data sources: (A) exports data is from WITS. (B) 
Sectoral employment is from ILO, (C) manufacturing employment is from UNIDO, instruments from Cotet and Tsui (2013). 
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. All coefficients (and standard errors) are multiplied by 
1000 to improve readability. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
